We study the strategic considerations of miners participating in the bitcoin's protocol. We formulate and study the stochastic game that underlies these strategic considerations. The miners collectively build a tree of blocks, and they are paid when they create a node (mine a block) which will end up in the path of the tree that is adopted by all. Since the miners can hide newly mined nodes, they play a game with incomplete information. Here we consider two simplified forms of this game in which the miners have complete information. In the simplest game the miners release every mined block immediately, but are strategic on which blocks to mine. In the second more complicated game, when a block is mined it is announced immediately, but it may not be released so that other miners cannot continue mining from it. A miner not only decides which blocks to mine, but also when to release blocks to other miners. In both games, we show that when the computational power of each miner is relatively small, their best response matches the expected behavior of the bitcoin designer. However, when the computational power of a miner is large, he deviates from the expected behavior, and other Nash equilibria arise.
INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is the most successful decentralized digital currency. It was first presented in the white paper [Nakamoto 2008 ] under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. Its backbone is the blockchain protocol which attempts to keep a consisted list of transactions in a peer-to-peer network. The blockchain protocol successfully solves the real distributed problem of agreement, and has the potential to support novel applications which require distributed computing across a network.
Game-theoretic issues are very important for the correct execution of the blockchain protocol. This was realized at its inception when its creator, Nakamoto, analyzed incentives in a simple, albeit insufficient, model. Understanding these issues is essential for the survival of bitcoin and the development of the blockchain protocol. In practice it can help understand their strengths and vulnerabilities and, in economic and algorithmic theory, it can provide an excellent example for studying how rational (selfish) players can play games in a distributed way and map out their possibilities and difficulties.
Distilling the essential game-theoretic properties of blockchain maintenance is far from trivial; some "attacks" and vulnerabilities have been proposed but there seems to exist no systematic way to discover them. In this work, we study two models in which the miners (the nodes of the distributed network that run the protocol and are paid for it) play a complete-information stochastic game. Although the miners in the actual blockchain game do not have complete information, our games aim to capture two important questions that selfish miners ask: (a) what to compute next (more precisely, which block to mine) and (b) when to release the results of computation (more precisely, when to release a mined block). By considering only complete information games, we may weaken the immediate applicability of the results, but we obtain a clean framework for studying these issues with proper focus and in a rigorous way.
We consider two stochastic games: (a) the immediate-release game in which every miner releases immediately the blocks that he mines; in this game, the strategy of every miner is to select an appropriate block to mine and (b) the strategic-release game in which miners not only can select which block to mine, but they can also withhold releasing blocks; we add the interesting twist that they must immediately announce a successful mining of a block but not the block itself; in this way, all miners have complete information of the current situation but can mine only the blocks which have been completely released by their discoverers. This interesting twist turns a very complicated game of incomplete information into an attractive, highly non-trivial game with complete information. We believe that although this is not the game actually modeling the real world 1 , it is of great value in understanding the game-theoretic aspects of the highly convoluted incomplete information game that takes place in the real world.
Our results
We consider two stochastic games whose states are rooted trees. The nodes of the tree are blocks that have been mined in the past. At every time-step, each miner selects a node of the current tree and tries to extend it by one new block. The probability that a miner succeeds in mining a new block is proportional to the miner's computational power. The utility of a miner is the fraction of successfully mined blocks in the common history, i.e., in the longest path from the root.
In the immediate-release game, the miner can select any node of the tree to mine, while in the strategic-release, the miner can select only nodes that have been (declared) released by their creator.
If a miner has computational power above a threshold, he may not mine a node at the frontier (the set of deepest nodes) in the hope that his blocks will become the accepted history instead of the already mined blocks. Also, he may not release a node immediately in the hope that the computational power of the other miners will be wasted in mining blocks which will not be part of the common history.
Our work seeks to identify the thresholds of the computational power below of which FRONTIER (the honest strategy) is a Nash equilibrium while above them it is no longer the optimal strategy. We denote by h 0 andĥ 0 the threshold for the immediate-release and the strategic-release games, respectively. It is easy to see that for both games h 0 ,ĥ 0 ∈ [0, 0.5]. Our results are as follows.
-We prove that in the immediate-release setting the threshold is 0.361 ≤ h 0 ≤ 0.455.
This implies that a miner with at most 36% of the total computational power can not gain more than 36% of the total rewards, i.e., his fair share which he would gain by being honest and following the suggested strategy FRONTIER; and that a miner with computational power more than 46% will always deviate from the honest strategy. An immediate consequence is that if every miner has computational power less than h 0 , then FRONTIER is a Nash equilibrium. We have experimentally determined that the actual threshold is close to h 0 ≈ 0.42. -Regarding the strategic-release setting, we prove rigorously that the corresponding threshold is lower bounded byĥ 0 ≥ 0.308 (root of the polynomial p 3 − 6p 2 + 5p − 1). A similar result was obtained recently by Sapirshtein, Sompolinsky, and Zohar in [Sapirstein et al. 2016] . Their result is tighter and sets the threshold below 0.33 (cf. Figure 2 in their paper for γ = 0). The difference between our approach and the approach of [Sapirstein et al. 2016] , is that they provide an algorithm to compute an approximately optimal strategy and then run their algorithm to estimate the threshold. The authors acknowledge the fact that their "algorithm copes with computational limitations by using finite MDPs as bounds to the original problem, and by analyzing the potential error that is due to inexact solutions". Our result on the other hand, gives an exact, albeit suboptimal bound on the threshold and considers exact best responses in a purely mathematical (not computational) way.
Open problems:. This work sets the stage and makes progress towards a systematic study of these complicated stochastic games. A lot of issues remain open. For example, besides the obvious problem of tightening our results, there are a lot of interesting questions about the Nash equilibria above the thresholds h 0 andĥ 0 in both types of games.
Related work
The Bitcoin protocol was originally introduced in [Nakamoto 2008 ] and was built based on ideas from [Back 1997] and [Dai 1998 ]. After the "creation" of Bitcoin several other alternative electronic currencies followed, known as altcoins (http://altcoins.com/), e.g., litecoin, Primecoin etc. The Bitcoin white paper provides a probabilistic analysis of double spending attacks while a more detailed analysis can be found in [Rosenfeld 2014 ]. Bitcoin's design and research challenges are discussed in [Bonneau et al. 2015] along with a presentation of the existing research. In [Tschorsch and Scheuermann 2015] an extensive and more introductory survey on distributed cryptocurrencies can be found.
The works most relevant to ours are [Kroll et al. 2013] , and [Sapirstein et al. 2016] . In [Kroll et al. 2013] , the equilibria of the Bitcoin game are considered. The authors observe that any monotonic strategy is a Nash equilibrium (one of many). Their analysis though is quite restricted: as we show, even in the case of the immediate release game, FRONTIER is not best response for values above 0.455. In , the authors prove that a guaranteed majority of honest miners is not enough to guarantee the security of the Bitcoin protocol. In particular they present a specific strategy called the "Selfish Mine" strategy and examine when this strategy is beneficial for a pool of miners. It appears that a fraction of 1/3 of the total processing power is always enough for a pool of miners to benefit by applying the Selfish Mine Strategy no matter the block propagation characteristics of the network (γ = 0 in their setting). Hence, this constitutes a profitable attack against the Bitcoin protocol. Furthermore, when block propagation is favoring the attacker the threshold above which "Selfish Mine" is beneficial is any non-zero value. It is not hard to see that the "Selfish Mine" strategy does not fully exploit settings where block propagation is more favorable to the attacker. This was observed in [Garay et al. 2015] where an optimal attack against the property of chain quality was considered in their setting where the network is considered to be completely adversarial. In [Sapirstein et al. 2016 ] the authors consider a wider set of possible strategies that includes the "SelfishMine" strategy and explore this space computationally. Their analysis also accounts for possible communication delays in the network, the presence of which can diminish the profit threshold.
A vast majority of previous work examines possible types of attacks against the Bitcoin protocol and suggest adaptations of the protocol to ensure its security. We very briefly mention some of these works here.
Successful pool mining related attacks are discussed in [Rosenfeld 2011] and [Courtois and Bahack 2014] . In ] the author considers attacks performed between different pools where users are sent to infiltrate a competitive pool giving raise to a pool game. See also [Lewenberg et al. 2015] for a (cooperative) game theoretic analysis regarding pool mining. [Babaioff et al. 2012 ] deals with information propagation and Sybil attacks. The authors propose a reward scheme which will make it in the best interest of a miner to propagate the transactions he is made aware of and not duplicate. [Kroll et al. 2013] considers an attack that can be performed from people that are only interested in destroying Bitcoin, as opposed to other attacks performed by users trying to increase their expected reward. This is called the Goldfinger attack. [Heilman et al. 2015] focuses on the peer-to-peer network and examines eclipse attacks where the attacker(s) isolates a node/user from the network and forces him to waste his computational power thus participating in an attack without even being aware. Certain deanonymization attacks have also recently been observed [Meiklejohn et al. 2013 ] by analysing the transactional graph (see also [Fergal Reid 2012] and [Ron and Shamir 2013] ).
In an alternative consensus method is described, called Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree or GHOST. A variant of GHOST has been adopted by Ethereum, a distributed applications platform that is built on top of block chains. attempts to overcome scalability issues that arise in Bitcoin (block size and interval vs latency and stability) by proposing a new scalable blockchain protocol. [Poon and Dryja 2015] provides another alternative for scalability that utilizes off chain transactions while using the distributed ledger for maintaining the contracts between the parties that engage in off chain transactions. In [Garay et al. 2015 ] the authors analyze the Bitcoin protocol in depth. They abstract the core of the protocol that they term the bitcoin backbone and prove formally its main attributes and properties, which can be used as building blocks for achieving goals other than simply maintaining a public ledger. They show that when the propagation delay in the network is relatively small, an honest majority of users is enough to guarantee smooth operation in a cryptographic model where the rationality of the players is not considered.
THE BITCOIN MINING GAME AND ITS VARIANTS
The game-theoretic issues of bitcoin mining can be captured by the following gametheoretic abstraction. The parameters of the game are:
-the number n of miners or players -the probabilities p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) that miners succeed in solving the crypto-puzzle; these are proportional to their computational power and they sum up to 1:
-the depth of the game d; the payment for mining a new block is not paid immediately, but only after a chain of certain number of new blocks is attached to it; in the cur-rent implementation of the Bitcoin protocol this number is d = 100. We will mainly consider games with d = ∞, but we will discuss briefly how they are affected by this parameter.
Two more parameters could play a role in a more general model of the protocol. The computational cost c * of mining a new block and the reward (payment) r * for it (currently approximately 25 bitcoins). Here we assume that the reward r * is constant and we scale all payments so that r * = 1. Also, if the expected gain is high enough to entice a miner to participate, 2 its actual value is not important, since the miner tries to maximize revenue.
Note that because of the distributed nature of the Bitcoin protocol, it is possible that more than one miners succeed almost simultaneously to mine a new block. We choose to ignore this aspect here; nevertheless, it is easy to generalize our model to a setting where n i=1 p i < 1 and thus there is a non-zero probability at each step that no miner will be awarded a block.
During the execution of the protocol, the miners build a tree of nodes/blocks to which they try to add more blocks. The protocol aims to increase the height of this tree by one every time a new node is created (every ten minutes on average) but this is not necessarily consistent with the incentives of the players who might chose to mine blocks that are not the deepest ones of the tree. Once a miner succeeds in creating a block, the new node is supposed to be added to the tree. However if the miner is strategic, he may have reasons not to add the newly discovered node to the tree. Therefore besides the publicly known tree, each miner might have his own private tree.
Definition 2.1 (State). A public state is simply a rooted tree. Every node is labeled by one of the players. The nodes represent mined blocks and the label indicates the player who mined the block. Every level of the tree has at most one node labeled i because there is no reason for a player to mine twice the same level.
A private state of player i is similar to the public state except it may contain more nodes called private nodes and labeled by i. The public tree is a subtree of the private tree and has the same root.
In the incomplete information case, the private states may also include the partial knowledge that players have about the other players (knowledge about the probabilities of other private trees, but also about their knowledge etc). This is a very complicated case, and we do not treat it in this work. Instead we treat two completeinformation cases in which the private states of all miners are common knowledge: Immediate-release model. Whenever a miner succeeds in mining a block, he releases it immediately, and all miners can continue from the newly mined block. Strategic-release model. Whenever a miner succeeds in mining a block, it becomes common knowledge. However, the miner may decide to postpone the release of the block. Until the block is released, other miners cannot continue mining from this block, although they are aware of its existence. While the second model has no counterpart in practice, we believe it is of high theoretical interest as it can serve as an intermediate model between immediate-release and strategic-release with incomplete information. The immediate-release model enables the study of miners that follow the protocol in terms of block propagation but mine strategically, while the strategic release allows us to extend the study to the gametheoretic issues of block witholding. Although ideally we would want to study the lat-ter under the incomplete information regime, we will defer this for future work since the game becomes substantially more complex to analyze. It is important to stress that any strategy in the full information setting is also a valid strategy in the incomplete information setting. Importantly, if a strategy is not dominant in the full information setting it cannot be dominant in the incomplete information setting.
We describe the set of strategies for the strategic-release case. The immediaterelease case is the special case in which the release function has been fixed to immediate-release.
Definition 2.2 (Strategy). A pure strategy of player i consists of two functions (µ i , ρ i ): -the mining function µ i which selects a node of the current public state to mine. -the release function ρ i which is a (perhaps empty) private part of the player's state which is added to the public state. Both functions depend on the state of knowledge of the miner.
The suggested strategy by the designer of the protocol is the FRONTIER strategy.
Definition 2.3 (FRONTIER). We say that a miner follows the FRONTIER strategy when he releases any mined block immediately and selects to mine one of the deepest nodes.
In the expected execution of the protocol in which all players play the FRONTIER strategy, the Bitcoin protocol creates a path. This is due to our simplifying assumption that no players simultaneously mine a block. In practice, the FRONTIER strategy creates something very close to a path, with occasional "orphan" blocks hanging from it.
The game is played in phases. In each phase, each player i uses his mining function µ i to select a block to mine. We assume that exactly one player succeeds in mining a block in each phase , and that the probability of success for each player is given by the probabilities (p 1 , . . . , p n ). The winner then adds the newly mined block to his private tree as a leaf hanging from a previously existing node. He then applies his release function which may add some of his private part of the tree (for example, the newly mined node) to the public tree. This may trigger a cascade of releases from other players. When the dust settles, we will have a new public tree, and each player will have updated knowledge 3 . The phase ends at this point and a new phase begins. Note that it is possible that the release function of the winning player may result in an empty release. Since here we consider the complete information case, all miners can immediately detect the end of the phase. In the incomplete information case however this is not possible, although the miners can estimate the probability of this happening, and that adds another complication in modeling strategic considerations in the incomplete information regime.
Payments for mining new blocks are essential to incentivize the players to try to mine new blocks. A miner who succeeds in mining a block is paid d phases later (currently d = 100); the delay is considered sufficient to guarantee that no long branches off the main path exist. The description of the payment scheme seems sufficient under the assumption that branches become stale quickly and that only the main trunk survives. With the term trunk we refer to a long path with ignored stale branches (i.e., the sibling of a node that is paid for as well as its descendants will get no payment at any point in time, thus they are effectively deleted).
A rigorous game-theoretic analysis of the Bitcoin protocol is quite complicated because of the potential strategic branching, and it requires a more precise definition of payments. To be consistent with the non-game-theoretic considerations of the Bitcoin protocol, we assume that at every level (i.e., height of the tree) only one node is paid for, the first one which succeeds in having a descendant d generations later. In graph-theoretic terms, a node u is paid for when its path from the root is extended by a path of length d; when this happens every sibling (as well as its descendants) of node u becomes stale.
Definition 2.4 (Payments). For some nodes of the tree, the miners who discovered them will get a fixed payment (normalized to 1). The payments comply with the following rules:
-the nodes that receive payment must form a path from the root. This immediately adds the restriction that at every level of the tree exactly one node receives payment. -among the nodes of a single level that satisfy the above path restriction, the first one which succeeds in having a descendant d generations later receives payment.
Since only one node per level is paid for, the utility of a miner in the long run is defined as the fraction of the total payment which he receives (his paid nodes over the total number of paid nodes).
When a node is paid for, rational miners will completely ignore every branch that starts at an earlier node. So in the long run, the tree essentially becomes the trunk with a small tree of depth at most d at the end. We will call such a game truncated at level d. Immediate-release truncated games are finite stochastic games.
We will also consider games that are not truncated at a specific level d. We have to do this with care, since it is possible that two or more miners will continue expanding their own branch forever and they will never agree. However, in our games this cannot happen in an optimal play when one miner has probability less than 1/2. The reason is that the utility of a miner is the fraction of the total payment he receives which is expected to be 0 if he keeps mining his own branch forever (a case of gambler's ruin).
THE IMMEDIATE-RELEASE GAME
In this section we determine the conditions which guarantee that the suggested FRON-TIER strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We fix the strategy of all but one miners to FRON-TIER and identify when FRONTIER is the best response of the remaining miner.
We can assume that all miners who follow the FRONTIER strategy by assumption act as a single miner (as mentioned, we consider only the simplified setting where miners do not simultaneously produce blocks). This gives rise to a two-player (two-miner) game: Miner 1 is the miner whose optimal strategy (best response) we wish to determine and has relative computational power p (p fraction of the total computational power), while Miner 2 is assumed to follow the FRONTIER strategy and have collective relative computational power 1 − p.
A (public) state is simply a rooted tree of width at most 2. In the immediate-release case, after pruning away stale (abandoned) branches, the state is a long path (called trunk) followed by two branches, one for each miner of lengths a and b (see Figure 1) . The lengths of these two branches determine the state and can be 0. Also because Miner 2 plays FRONTIER, his path must be the longest one, except temporarily when Miner 1 mines a block and moves ahead; in this case we have a = b + 1, and when this happens, Miner 2 abandons his path and continues from the frontier of the other path. To summarize, the states of the game are the pairs (a, b) with 0 ≤ a ≤ b + 1.
The set of states (a, b) can be partitioned into three parts (see Figure 1 ): Note that when Miner 1 capitulates and abandons his own branch, he can choose to move to any state (0, s). Since the miner is rational, he will select the best of these states (we assume that in case of a tie, he will always select the same state). It follows that without loss of generality we can describe fully the strategy of Miner 1 by specifying the set of mining states M and the state (0, s) that is chosen when Miner 1 capitulates. The set of deterministic strategies of Miner 1 is exactly the set of pairs (M , s), where M is the set of mining states and (0, s) is the landing state to which the miner jumps from any capitulation state.
Let g k (a, b) denote the expected gain of Miner 1 when the frontier advances by k new levels starting from an initial tree in which the branches of Miner 1 and 2 have lengths a and b, respectively. It should be intuitively clear that, in the long run, the expected gain per level should be almost independent of the initial state. As a result, for large k, k , it should be that g k (a, b) − g k (a, b) is independent of a, b and thus it is merely a function of k, k . Furthermore, assuming that constant rewards are given and expenses per block created remain constant, it will hold that g k (a, b) satisfies for any large k, k ,
for some constant g * which represents the expected gain per level in the long run. Based on this we can define the expected gain as
where the potential function ϕ(a, b) = lim k→∞ g k (a, b) − k · g * denotes the advantage of Miner 1 for currently being in state (a, b); that this limit exists follows from a straightforward argument 4 . The objective of Miner 1 is to maximize g * . For a strategy (M, s), we can define g k (a, b) recursively as follows. When the current state is (a, b), there are three possibilities:
-If (a, b) ∈ M , both miners continue mining. With probability p, Miner 1 succeeds to mine the next block first and the new state is (a+1, b); with the remaining probability Miner 2 succeeds and the new state is (a, b + 1). -If (a, b) ∈ C, Miner 1 abandons his branch and the new state is (0, s). The trunk increases by b − s blocks. -If (a, b) ∈ W , Miner 2 abandons his branch and the new state is (0, 0). The gain for Miner 1 is a · g * . The trunk increases by a blocks.
The frontier advances when either Miner 2 wins or when Miner 1 wins and a = b, thus reaching a winning state. From the above consideration, we get
and by definition g 0 (a, b) = 0. From this, we can get a similar recurrence for ϕ:
We also fix ϕ(0, 0) = 0; note that the potential of all states is non-negative. We note that the above definitions do not take depth d into account (consider d = ∞). This is without loss of generality for the proof of Theorem 3.2 where we use this recurrence, as proving that FRONTIER is best response for d = ∞ (i.e., when Miner 1 has a superset of available winning paths than for any constant d) implies that the result also holds for any constant d. If every miner plays FRONTIER, their expected gain is proportional to the probability of mining a block and therefore proportional to their relative computational power p i . From this we get the following proposition. PROPOSITION 3.1. FRONTIER is a Nash equilibrium if, having fixed the strategy of all miners except i to FRONTIER, the best response of a miner i has expected gain per level equal to p i .
FRONTIER is a NE iff
In this section we bound the threshold on the computational power of each miner so that FRONTIER is a Nash equilibrium. The main result is the lower bound that follows. THEOREM 3.2. In the immediate-release model, FRONTIER is a Nash equilibrium when every miner i has relative computational power
Starting in a mining state, one of the two miners will eventually capitulate and join the other branch.
5 The probability that the miner wins such a race plays a significant role in our analysis. A formal definition follows.
Definition 3.3. Let r M,s (a, b) denote the winning probability starting at state (a, b), that is, the probability that a winning state will be reached before a capitulation state.
We will use the notation of r(a, b) for the optimal strategy (M , s), and r ∞ (a, b) when the miner never capitulates (i.e., when C = ∅).
The probability r M,s (a, b) can be defined recursively as follows:
The next simple lemma which bounds the probability r(a, b), plays a central role in our analysis: LEMMA 3.4. The following holds for every state (a, b):
PROOF. The inequality follows from the fact that the miner has more opportunities/paths to reach a winning state when he never gives up.
Regarding the equality, we essentially want to solve the recurrence for r ∞
Consider the quantity l = 1 + b − a which captures the distance of state (a, b) from the set of winning states. This quantity decreases by one when the miner succeeds in mining a block, and increases by one when the opponent succeeds. Since we consider r ∞ , the case in which the miner never gives up, the situation is a gambler's ruin version: the quantity l behaves as the position of a biased random walk on a half-line with an absorbing state at 0, probability p of moving away from the absorbing state, and probability 1 − p of moving towards the absorbing state. The probability r ∞ (a, b) is the probability of reaching the absorbing state starting at position l = 1 + b − a which can be easily computed to be (
The next lemma gives a very simple necessary and sufficient condition for the potential function so that FRONTIER is a Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, the condition states that Miner 1 capitulates from state (0, 1), so no other state except (0, 0) will ever be reached. PROOF. From the definition of ϕ, we have:
Since FRONTIER is best response if and only if g * = p (recall Proposition 3.1), the lemma follows.
We now derive a very useful relation between the expected optimal gain of a pair of states and the winning probability of one of them. LEMMA 3.6. For every state (a, b) and every nonnegative integers c and k:
Conversely for p < 1/2, there is a,b (k) which tends to 0 as k tends to infinity, such that
PROOF. We focus on the first inequality since the proof of the second inequality follows from similar reasoning. Suppose that the current state is (a, b) and Miner 1 continues playing not in the optimal way, but by simulating the strategy that he would follow had the current state been (a + c, b + c). The crucial observation is that the simulation can be carried out because the strategy of the other miner, based only on the difference b − a, is unaffected.
Letḡ k (a, b) be the gain for the next k levels using this potentially suboptimal strategy. Let alsor be the probability that Miner 1 will reach a winning before a capitulation state (within the next k levels). Then we must havē
Now, since the simulated strategy cannot be better that the optimal strategy, it is clear that g k (a, b) ≥ḡ k (a, b) . Furthermore, the probability r(a + c, b + c), which is the probability that Miner 1 wins the race even if more than k levels are used, is at least equal tor. These two bounds give the first part of the lemma:
The second inequality follows from similar considerations and in particular by starting in state (a + c, b + c) and simulating the strategy as being in state (a, b). The term a,b (k) is needed because now we want to bound the probabilityr from below:r = r(a, b) − a,b (k), where a,b (k) is the probability that Miner 1 will win the race in more than k levels. This probability tends to 0 as k tends to infinity; in particular for p < 1/2, this is bounded by the probability that a gambler with initial value a and probability of success p < 1/2 will win against a bank of initial value b after Θ(k) steps.
The second part of the previous lemma will not be used in this work, but it may prove helpful to tighten our results. The following corollary is a direct consequence of the first part of the lemma. It should be intuitively clear that the gain g k (a, b) is non-decreasing in a as having mined more blocks cannot hurt the miner. Therefore we get the following useful fact which can also be easily proved by double backwards induction on b and a. PROPOSITION 3.8. The potential ϕ(a, b) is non-decreasing in a.
The following three lemmas use the above results to provide explicit bounds on the potential of states (1, 2), (0, 2), and (0, 1) under certain assumptions on the best response of Miner 1 and his computational power. LEMMA 3.9. For every p:
PROOF. Consider the potential of state (1, 1). We know that
On the other hand, from Corollary 3.7 and Lemma 3.4 we can bound it from above by ϕ(1, 1) ≤ ϕ(0, 0) + r(1, 1) ≤ p 1−p . By putting the two bounds together and eliminating ϕ(1, 1) we get the lemma.
It follows that for p <
is not a mining state.
PROOF. To bound ϕ(0, 2) we use the bound for ϕ(1, 2) from the previous lemma and a bound for ϕ(0, 3). To bound ϕ(0, 3) we use the monotonicity property of ϕ(a, b) with respect to a and apply Corollary 3.7 and Lemma 3.4 to ϕ(1, 3):
Assuming now that (0, 2) is a mining state, we get:
and by solving for ϕ(0, 2):
The coefficient of g * is negative for p ≤ (3 − √ 5)/2, so we can replace it by p to get the first part of the lemma (recall that g * is always greater or equal to p). For the second part of the lemma, it suffices to observe that for p <
is negative. Since the potential cannot be negative, it follows by contradiction that (0, 2) ∈ M . LEMMA 3.11. For p < (3 − √ 5)/2, if (0, 1) is a mining state, then (0, 2) is also a mining state and
PROOF. First we bound ϕ(0, 1) if we assume that (0, 1) ∈ M . Note that this easily implies that also state (1, 1) is a mining state. We get
where we used the bound for ϕ(1, 2) from above and ϕ(2, 1) = 2 − g * . Towards a contradiction assume now that (0, 2) ∈ M . That is, the miner capitulates at state (0, 2) and moves to either state (0, 1) or state (0, 0). Since the miner can move to state (0, 0) in two steps by first moving to state (0, 1), we can assume without loss of generality that he moves to state (0, 1) and therefore ϕ(0, 2) = ϕ(0, 1). By substituting this in the above expression we get
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section. We use the bounds provided by the previous three technical lemmas (together with Lemma 3.5) to prove that Miner 1 capitulates from state (0, 1), and that FRONTIER therefore is his best response.
1/3 ), Lemma 3.10 establishes that (0, 2) is not a mining state. But then from Lemma 3.11, neither state (0, 1) is a mining state, or equivalently, FRONTIER is the best-response strategy of Miner 1.
Upper bound
The main theorem of this section, Theorem 3.2, shows that if each miner i has relative computational power p i < 0.361, FRONTIER is a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, it is intuitively clear that if a miner has computational power close to 1/2, he will have some advantage if he does not play FRONTIER, against miners who play FRONTIER. Recall that h 0 denotes the maximum relative computational power of each miner for which FRONTIER is a Nash equilibrium. Experimental results stated in Table I , based on computing the potential ϕ, show that h 0 = 0.418. 
Our work in this section is to estimate the threshold h 0 . Providing rigorous lower bounds for h 0 -as we do in Theorem 3.2-does not appear to be easy since it involves a non-trivial Markov decision process. However, it is not too hard to obtain good upper bounds of h 0 as it suffices to come up with a mining strategy that has expected gain g * greater than p. Here we provide a simple such upper bound which can be directly extended to get an upper bound of h 0 close to 0.418. THEOREM 3.12. When Miner 2 plays FRONTIER, the best response strategy for Miner 1 is not FRONTIER when p ≥ 0.455.
PROOF. It suffices to consider a fixed mining strategy (M, s) that has expected gain per step g * greater than p. We consider a mining strategy truncated at d = 3, i.e., the miner capitulates at every state (a, b) with b ≥ 3.
We select M = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)} and s = 1 and define the potential for this strategy as follows:
We need to select g * and verify that this is the correct potential. In particular, we need to verify that for all mining states (a, b) ∈ M we have ϕ(a, b) ≥ ϕ(0, 1), which holds when
We can also verify that for p ≥ 0.455, the expected gain g * is strictly greater than p, which establishes that the strategy (M, s) is a better response than FRONTIER.
The strategy employed in the proof of the theorem is optimal for the truncated game at d = 3 when p ≈ 0.455. As we mentioned above, one can compute the optimal strategy for the finite games truncated at d = 4, 5 and so on, to get better and better upper bounds. These bounds converge relatively quickly to h 0 = 0.418.
THE STRATEGIC-RELEASE GAME
Similarly to the immediate-release case, we wish to identify conditions such that FRONTIER is a Nash equilibrium. To do so, we again assume that all but one miner, say Miner 1, use the FRONTIER strategy, and then examine the best response of Miner 1. Since all honest miners select the same block to mine and release it immediately once it is mined, they essentially act as one miner, and it is sufficient to consider the case of two miners.
As in the immediate-release case, the tree created by the two miners has width 2. The trunk is permanently fixed and can be safely ignored; hence, the situation is captured by the two branches of the execution tree in addition to a bit of information regarding each block in Miner 1's branch specifying whether or not Miner 1 has released this block. In particular, this situation can be captured by a triple of numbers a, a r and b, where a and b denote the number of blocks mined by Miner 1 and the honest miner, respectively (the length of the two branches), while a r ≤ a denotes the number of the released blocks on Miner's 1 branch (note that they are consecutive blocks starting from (0, 0)). Since the honest miner immediately announces the mined blocks, all b blocks on his branch are always released. Also, contrary to the immediate-release case, it can be a > b + 1.
Under the assumption that Miner 2 follows the FRONTIER strategy, we know that if Miner 1 has released a r ≤ b blocks, then Miner 2 will not abandon his path, but if a r > b then the honest miner will immediately capitulate. So, without loss of generality we can assume that if a ≤ b then a r = a while if a > b, then a r = b, otherwise the honest miner would have immediately abandoned his path, and the game would be at state (a − a r , 0). In other words, we can always consider a r = min{a, b}; hence we can capture the state of the game by the tuple (a, b) as in the immediate-release case.
Letĝ k (a, b) denote the expected gain of Miner 1 when the branch of the honest miner in the execution tree is extended by k new levels starting from an initial tree in which the non-common parts of the paths have length a and b, but Miner 1 has only released the first min{a, b} blocks on his path. It should be intuitively clear that, in the long run, the expected gain per level should be almost independent of the initial state. With this in mind, we can write the expected gain aŝ
for some constantĝ * which is the expected gain per level in the long run. The potential functionφ(a, b) denotes the advantage of Miner 1 for currently being in state (a, b) (and having released min{a, b} blocks).
We can defineĝ k (a, b) as follows:
-If a ≤ b, Miner 1 has two options: to capitulate or to mine. In the latter case, the next state will be (a + 1, b) with probability p, and (a, b + 1) with the remaining probability. -If a > b, Miner 1 has one additional option to the previous case: he can release an additional block and lead the game to state (a − b − 1, 0). When this happens, Miner 2 who plays FRONTIER capitulates. Note that we allow Miner 1 to repeatedly release blocks, which is equivalent to allowing him to release any number of blocks.
From the above consideration, we get the following optimal gain for Miner 1: 
where the last term inside the max applies only when a ≥ b + 1; equivalently we can defineĝ k (a, 0) = −∞ for any k when a < 0. The base case of the recurrence iŝ g 0 (a, b) = 0. As in the case of immediate-release, we define a potentialφ from g k (a, b) = kĝ * +φ(a, b), when k tends to infinity. We also note that the definition above does not take d into account (considers d = ∞). This is without loss of generality for the proof of Theorem 4.1 as proving the result for d = ∞ is stronger (as Miner 1 has a superset of available winning paths than for any constant d).
The recurrence for the potential iŝ 
where again we defineφ(a, 0) = −∞ when a < 0. We also fix the valueφ(0, 0) = 0.
4.1. FRONTIER is a NE iff p ≤ĥ0, whereĥ0 ≥ 0.308
In this section we will show the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.1. In the strategic-release model, FRONTIER is a Nash equilibrium when every miner i has relative computational power p i ≤ 0.308 (root of the polynomial p 3 − 6p 2 + 5p − 1).
Theorem 3.2 established that for any p ≤ 0.361 there exists a potential ϕ for the immediate-release model such that ϕ(0, 0) = ϕ(0, 1) and g * = p. The main idea of the proof is to extend this potential to states (a, b) such that a > b + 1. This is possible, for the following reasons:
-for states (b + 1, b), when p is small and Miner 1 is one block ahead of Miner 2, there is a high risk if he does not release the block; the risk is that Miner 2 can mine one extra block and then Miner 1 may end up in a stale branch. -for states (a, b) with a > b + 1, when Miner 1 is at least two blocks ahead, it is safe not to release any blocks until Miner 2 catches up to within distance one.
With this in mind, we define the following potential Note that when Miner 1 capitulates, he starts mining at one of the states (0, s) where s ≤ b − 1, where by assumption the potential is 0. To prove the theorem, we first show that ϕ satisfies the recurrence of the strategic-release potential (5) whenĝ * = p. Equivalently, using the above notation ϕ(a, b) = max(ϕ M (a, b), ϕ R (a, b), ϕ C (a, b)).
LEMMA 4.2. The potential ϕ satisfies the recurrence (5) whenĝ * = p and p ≤ 0.308 (root of the polynomial p 3 − 6p 2 + 5p − 1).
PROOF. We break down the proof into three distinct claims: Using the alternative definition of ϕ, the claim holds trivially, since ϕ satisfies it, and ϕ R (a, b) = −∞. 
